Rights equity issue is one of the most common methods for subsequent equity issue in the Indian market. In rights offer, current shareholders are given short-term warrants on a pro-rata basis with the option to either purchase the new shares or sell the warrants in the market before expiration. Rights equity issue can be a potential solution to the adverse selection problem associated with capital issue and has comparatively low direct costs. In this paper, the authors analyse the operating performance of the BSElisted manufacturing firms following rights equity issue and their linkages with firmspecific characteristics as hypothesized in the finance theory. They have selected 392 rights equity issues during the period 1991-2000 and used a methodology robust to the mean-reverting nature of accounting income. Consistent with empirical results for seasoned equity offerings in the US market, there is a statistically significant decline in the operating performance after the rights equity issue. This decline in performance is more severe for big firms, low market-to-book value firms, and firms with lower directors' holdings. Interestingly, foreign companies and companies belonging to small business groups do not show any declining trend. The authors find that the decline in performance is due to the inefficiency in utilization of assets and not due to decrease in profit margins. Further, various proxies measuring market valuation also decline during the post-issue period after a run up in the pre-issue period. The results of the study suggest that over-investment hypothesis and agency models can better explain the decline in performance compared to asymmetric information hypothesis. The results also indicate that rights equity issues are not simple de-leveraging decisions. These findings have implications for several groups of capital market participants and the authors conclude with specific guidelines for them which are as follows:
W hen a firm wishes to raise new funds, it can do so in a variety of ways. One of the most basic policy choices confronting managers is deciding on what type of security to issue. Though there is no unified theory available to explain the corporate financing decision, there have been substantial improvements in the modern theory of capital structure beginning with the celebrated paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) .
Researchers have reported a number of regularities regarding the security-price performance and earnings behaviour around seasoned equity issues ( see Masulis, 1995 and Ritter, 2003 for detailed surveys on security issue). Majority of these results are from developed countries and can be classified into three major heads, viz., announcement effects, long-run operating performance, and long-run security-price performance. Though rights issues have an insignificant announcement effect, the negative reaction to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from developed markets like the US is well documented (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986) . Recent studies show that this is generally followed by statistically and economically significant long-run underperformance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995) . Further, the deteriorating operating performance following equity issues (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; McLaughlin, Sufieddine and Vasudevan, 1998) and earnings management associated with SEOs (Teoh, Selch and Wong, 1998; Shivakumar, 2000) provide some explanation for this behaviour.
In many capital markets, majority of the subsequent equity issues after initial public offerings are sold through rights issue (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995) . In a rights offer, current shareholders are given short-term warrants on a pro-rata basis allowing them the option to either purchase the new shares or sell the warrants in the market before expiration. Unsubscribed shares are offered to the shareholders who wish to purchase more than their pro-rata share of the issue. The market reaction to announcement of rights issue is mixed. Therefore, whether the empirical regularities reported from the US market for SEOs are relevant for rights equity issues in other countries is a question which needs further investigation. Further, the institutional mechanisms in a developing country like India differ widely from these well-developed markets which provide an interesting opportunity to study how firmspecific variables can explain this behaviour.
In this paper, we examine the operating performance following rights equity issue for a large sample of firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) using long-run operating performance analysis (Barber and Lyon, 1996) and cross-sectional regressions. In this study, we have relied on accounting measures due to two reasons. First, the inefficiency of the market/frequent market scams and the 'bad model problem' (Fama, 1998) will have little impact on our results. Second, we will be able to analyse the behaviour of large sample of firms which includes many companies with illiquid stocks as well. We have used two major corporate databases, viz., Prowess database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) and Capitaline 2000 of Capital Market Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Our results have shown that subsequent to the rights issue, firms' operating performance has declined compared to control firms. This decline is economically significant in all the five years which we analysed and statistically significant in most of the years. The decline in performance is more severe for big firms, low marketto-book value firms, and firms with lower directors' holdings. We find that this phenomenon is due to the inefficiency in utilization of assets and not due to decrease in profit margins. Further, various proxies measuring market valuation also decline during the post-issue period after a run up in the pre-issue period. The firms' declining performance is related to the investment opportunity and agency cost variables. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) argue that issuing common stock through non-transferable rights to existing shares is a potential solution to the adverse selection problem associated with subsequent equity issue. Similarly, rights offerings have comparatively low direct costs. Unlike the situation in US markets, markets in Canada, Europe, and Pacific Basin do not show an aversion to rights issue (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) . Most firms in the US issuing new security are using the apparently more costly underwritten offer rather than the less costly rights offer which is considered as a 'paradox' in finance (Smith, 1977; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) . But, several authors including Hansen (1988) and Eckbo and Masulis (1995) have argued that there are some additional costs associated with rights issue. Along with the indirect costs like capital gains taxes in the event of renouncement of rights, transaction costs of reselling the rights-shares, wealth transfer to convertible security holders (due to anti-dilution clause), and agency problems like pressure from investment bankers may also lead to public issue. The theoretical models explaining the reasons for the rights issue paradox are limited in their scope. The model developed by Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) assumes asymmetric information between investors and managers. Based upon the quality of firms, they rank the three financing alternatives, viz., standby rights, uninsured rights, and underwritten issue in that order.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Models
The major explanations to the well-documented market reactions around security issue are based on the information content of corporate financial policy. These theories can be classified under two areas, viz., agency costs and information asymmetries.
Models Based on Agency Costs
Agency cost-based models argue that changes in capital structure change the incentives of corporate managers. The 'free cash flow model' of Jensen (1986) argues that managers do not like to disburse free cash to investors even when no positive net present value (NPV) project is available. Since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of free cash available to managers. But, on the other hand, equity issues increase free cash flow available to managers and are, therefore, detrimental to firm performance and value. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) point out that the conflicts between debt-holders and equity-holders may result in stringent debt contract. So, the capital structure decisions are also based on the 'agency costs' of debt along with the disciplinary influence of debt. The model proposed by Stulz (1990) also points out the role of debt payments in reducing the resources under the discretion of managers who are disposed to over-invest. The agency cost of debt as per this model is that debt payments may result in underinvestment or reduce the funds available for profitable investment. In other words, the models of Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that leverage can reduce the agency costs arising from the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Another line of argument considers debt as a tool for avoiding takeover challenges (Zwiebel, 1996) . Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that debt serves as a disciplining device in the sense that debt servicing allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation. The major implication of these models is that changes in leverage should be accompanied by a change in stock price in the same direction.
Asymmetric Information and Signalling Models
As per the asymmetric information models, financing choices of the managers reveal some of their private information to the market. Based on the game theoretic approach, these models assume that it is prohibitively costly for low quality firms to perfectly mimic high quality firms. Some of the earliest signalling models in finance literature like that of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) discuss the signalling role of debt. In Ross' Model, the proportion of debt signals the quality of the firm. Here, the cost of the signal is the bankruptcy costs which are lower for high quality firms. Leland and Pyle (1977) agree that the retention of shares by insiders signals better future prospects for the firm. Since large debt is associated with a higher proportion of equity owned by insiders, higher debt level is associated with higher firm quality. Miller and Rock (1985) provide an alternative explanation for the price reactions and performance changes. In their model, all firms have fixed investment opportunities with diminishing marginal returns. Since the sources of funds must equal the uses of funds, security offerings signal that the firm had an unexpected fall in earnings. Myers and Majluf's (1984) model argues that managers will prefer debt to equity if they need external funds because, if firms are issuing equity, underpricing may lead to erosion of old shareholders' value. Therefore, managers issue equity only when it is overvalued. So, in an efficient market, equity offerings will result in a reduction of a firm's market value. According to them, rights issue can minimize this conflict to a certain extent. Building on Myers and Majluf (1984) , Eckbo and Masulis (1992) proposed that rights issues will be used only by firms with highly concentrated ownership. Hansen, Ma and Pinkerton (1986) also argue that firms with concentrated share ownership will find rights offers less expensive. This leads to the conclusion that when a firm with diversified ownership is going for a rights issue, it signals that rights offerings are the only method available to them.
When a company announces rights equity issue, the management is conveying information both about investment and financing. The financing signal that internal funds will be insufficient to finance its activities is not good news. The investment signal is that it would like to invest aggressively. The implication of this signal depends upon the investment opportunity of the firm.
Empirical Studies
There is a well-documented empirical pattern in market reactions to security issue announcements. Stock price reactions to announcements of leverage increasing transactions are favourable compared to leverage decreasing transactions (Smith, 1986; Eckbo and Masulis, 1995) . Masulis and Korwar (1986) report an average abnormal return of -3.19 per cent for industrial firms and -0.56 per cent for public utilities on a two-day interval (day 0 and +1) around offering announcements of seasoned common stock. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report an abnormal return of -1.0 per cent for rights offerings. These results are consistent with the signalling models as equity issues are conveying negative information to the market. In view of the fact that the seasoned equity issues in Canada, Europe, and Pacific-Basin capital markets are predominantly through rights issue, studies from these markets will be more applicable to the Indian market. Studies from these markets report a positive abnormal return around rights offer announcement (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995) .
There are a number of studies analysing the operating performance of firms following SEOs. Loughran and Ritter's (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves' (1995) are two major studies documenting the long-run underperformance of firms after SEOs. Healy and Palepu (1990) examine the changes in earnings and risk for a sample of NYSE and AMEX listed firms issuing seasoned equity. Their study finds no evidence of performance decline following equity issue. Loughran and Ritter (1997) examine the changes in operating performance for a sample of 1,338 SEOs and document poor post-issue operating performance. Similarly, McLaughlin, Sufieddine and Vasudevan (1998) report a decline in the operating performance for a sample of 1,967 firms that issued security from 1980 to 1993.
Though there is no unified theory to explain this anomaly, many explanations are available in the financial literature. One explanation is the 'windows of opportunity hypothesis' offered by Loughran and Ritter (1995) which states that firms issue equity when they are overvalued irrespective of whether they need funds or not. Recently, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) and Rangan (1998) hypothesized that the earnings management at the time of equity offerings could well explain this anomaly. They documented negative relation between pre-issue abnormal accruals and post-issue abnormal security returns. However, after re-examining the 'earnings management hypothesis, ' Shivakumar (2000) argues that the earnings management at the time of equity offering is not intended to mislead investors but it merely reflects the issuers' rational response to anticipated market behaviour after seasoned equity issue announcements.
Indian Studies
Findings of studies on the market behaviour around rights announcements in the Indian market are different from that of the US. For example, Srinivasan (1993) and Rao (1994) report significant positive abnormal returns around rights offer announcements. These results are comparable to some studies that report positive market reaction to equity announcement for a group of growth firms. Stock market reactions to corporate policy decision may differ across countries (Kang and Stulz, 1996) and the theoretical models developed for the US market may not be directly applicable to Indian conditions. The major factors that may contribute to the differences are:
legal and regulatory differences 'market scams' in India differences in corporate control mechanisms institutional differences and/or market inefficiencies. The financial sector reforms initiated in 1992 and a number of policy initiatives from the Government of India have resulted in exponential growth in the securities market in India. The 1990s witnessed a change in financing pattern of Indian companies and their dependence on securities market compared to their dependence on banks and development financial institutions. The corporate sector is increasingly depending on external sources for meeting its funding requirements. There appears to be growing preference for direct financing (equity and debt) to indirect financing (bank loan) within the external sources. According to CMIE data, the share of capital market-based instruments in resources raised externally increased to 53 per cent in 1993-94 but declined thereafter to 31 per cent by 2000-01. Our study period provides an interesting period of the Indian financial system during which it has undergone a transition from a bank-based financial system to a market-based financial system.
The Indian data on rights issue for the post-liberalization period (1992) cannot be studied without considering the fact that most of these rights issues were deleveraging transactions (Varma, 1998) . We need to consider the impact of leverage while explaining the market reaction to rights issue in the post-liberalized era. Raymar (1993) argues that equity issuance may be a positive event
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OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRMS when a firm has a high debt level. He shows that in the presence of a sufficient degree of leverage and default risk, a positive market response is possible for equity issuance. But, once the issue of agency cost is considered, this reaction cannot be expected (Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996) . Another important factor is the growth opportunities of the firm. McConnel and Servaes (1995) argue that while the corporate value of the high-growth firms is negatively correlated with leverage, for the low-growth firms the correlation is positive. Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) also provide similar evidence.
A stock-exchange listed company in India can raise equity capital through public issue, preferential allotment, and rights issue. In the Indian market, rights issues are normally made below market prices (may be due to the minimum subscription clause) and are similar to bonus issues/stock dividends in some respects (Barua, Raghunathan and Varma, 1994) . This observation is consistent with Kothare (1997) who examined the market micro-structure effects of the rights from the perspective that rights issues should have the effect of stock split and argued that the effect in micro-structure should be comparable to that. A rights issue at a discount from the market price can be decomposed conceptually into a bonus issue and an equity issue at market price. Bigelli and Scaravilli (1998) observed that the positive market reaction to the announcement of most of the European rights could be explained by the quasi-split effect which signals a large increase in dividends.
SAMPLE AND DATA
We obtained the initial sample of 1,191 rights equity offerings made by the companies listed on the BSE during the financial years 1990-91 to 1999-2000 from the Prowess database (this excludes all rights debt offerings and convertible debt offerings). From this, we have selected the final list of 392 offerings meeting the following criteria:
• The offering amount should be at least Rs 10 million and the number of new shares offered should be in the range of 25 to 500 per cent of the shares outstanding before the issue. This ensured the exclusion of insignificant issues and extreme cases and thus resulted in the deletion of 220 issues from the sample.
• As we are examining the operating performance of firms for five years after the issue, we excluded the firms that have conducted a rights offering within the previous five years. This resulted in the deletion of additional 211 issues. As data on capital changes from the Prowess database started only from the year 1990, we obtained data from Capitaline 2000 for the financial years 1985-86 to 1989-90.
• The financial data for the issuing firm must be available in year-1 as we require the same to select the control firms. This restriction resulted in the exclusion of 107 firms. We have also excluded 25 firms with asset size less than Rs 50 million.
• We have excluded non-manufacturing companies from the sample as the financial reporting practices in service industries (especially in banks and financial institutions) and utilities differ widely from the manufacturing companies. In a separate analysis, we have included these 120 firms and found that the results are not materially different and conclusions are qualitatively the same.
• Public issues/ IPOs have an impact on the operating performance. Thus, we have excluded firms with public issue/IPOs during five years immediately preceding the rights issue. As expected, inclusion of these 116 firms in the sample makes the declining trend in performance more severe. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by financial year. From the table, it is evident that the sample has a high concentration during 1993-1995 period with 27.55 per cent of the sample in the financial year 1993. Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample by industry. The maximum of 23 per cent of the sample is from the 
Control Firm Selection
The operating performance of the sample firms should be compared to a proper benchmark to arrive at conclusions. Barber and Lyon (1996) evaluated the method to measure the operating performance by conducting simulations similar to Brown and Warner (1985) and made specific suggestions regarding the selection of control firms. We have used the specific algorithm suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996) with minor modifications. The matching firm is selected from the list of non-rights equity issuers for the year of the issue with a minimum asset size of Rs 50 million in the previous year. We have excluded firms that have issued rights equity during the previous five years. From this, we have selected a control firm meeting the following three criteria:
• It should be from the same industry.
• The asset size should be within 70 -130 per cent of the asset size of the sample firm.
• The operating performance defined as the operating cash flow to total assets should be in the range of 90 -110 per cent. If the operating cash flow of the sample firm is less than 5 per cent, then the operating performance should be +/-0.5 of the operating cash flow of the sample. In case there were no matching firms meeting the above three requirements, we relaxed the industry classification criteria. If more than one firm was available, we selected the firm in the same ownership group as that of the sample firm. This selection criterion can account for the economy-and industry-wide effects on operating performance, mean reversion in operating income, and, to a certain extent, impact of ownership structure on operating income.
METHODOLOGY
Due to the existence of extreme observations in operating performance measures, non-parametric Wilcoxon Test statistics is more powerful than parametric t-statistic (Barber and Lyon, 1996) . Therefore, we have used nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-ranks Test which tests the null hypothesis that the median abnormal performance is equal to zero. Here the Z-statistic is computed as
where
(3) n = no. of matched observation for the period Although our sample has 392 rights equity issues, the sample size reported in the tests varies because of the missing items in the Prowess database for the sample and the matching firms.
We have employed OLS regression analysis after winsorizing the variables at first percentile and at 99th percentile. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's procedure (White, 1980) .
Variable Definitions
We use operating cash flow to measure operating performance as other measures (like earnings per share) may be affected by accounting manipulations. Operating cash flow is defined in the Prowess data field as 'pbdit_ nnrt_noi+amortization' where pbdit_nnrt_noi+ = Profit before interest depreciation amortization and tax -extra_ordinary_inc + extra_ordinary_exp -other_ income + amortization extra_ordinary_inc = non-recurring income extra_ordinary_exp = non-recurring expenses We use profit before interest and tax (Prowess item: pbit) as an alternative measure of performance to check robustness of our results.
We use book value of net assets (Prowess item: tot_assets) to scale operating income in order to compare performance across firms. Since the rights issue sample can have a large increase in the book value of assets without any commensurate increase in their operating income, we have used 'net sales' (Prowess item: net_sales) as an- All the values relating to issuer characteristics are taken from the fiscal year immediately preceding the rights issue year (i.e. year-1). Market capitalization, total assets, net sales, and security amount are measured in millions of rupees. Age is the difference between the year of issue and the year of incorporation. Relative issue size is the ratio of security amount to the total assets. Ratio is defined as the number of equity shares issued to a holder of a single share.
other scaling factor. 'Net sales' is defined as sales less indirect taxes. Table 3 presents the definition of the variables used in the study.
In Table 3 , all the variables are based on accounting information except the last three. We have included the last three variables which are based on market valuation of the firms to check the robustness of our results. Table  4 reports descriptive statistics of issuer and issue characteristics.
RESULTS
Our results are presented under various sub-sections. First, we report the abnormal operating performance of issuers in the three years before the issue and five years after the issue. In the next sub-section, we present a univariate analysis linking the firm-specific variables with the abnormal operating performance. Then, we present the changes in leverage subsequent to the rights issue. This is followed by a multivariate analysis by incorporating firm-specific variables. Finally, we compare operating performance results with changes in market expectations over the post-issue period.
Pattern of Operating Income around Rights Issue
In Table 5 , we report the behaviour of operating cash flow, accounting profit, operating margin, and assets turnover ratio. All the ratios show a clear declining trend before adjusting with control firms. Levels of adjusted ratios also show poor post-issue performance except in the case of operating margin. The median cash flow return for the sample firms has declined to 9.22 per cent in year +5 from VIKALPA • VOLUME 28 • NO 4 • OCTOBER -DECEMBER 2003 31 14.96 per cent in the year before the issue. This decline is statistically significant in three years out of the five years. After decomposing the operating cash flow into operating margin and assets turnover ratio, it can be observed that this decline is due to the inefficiency of the firms in utilizing the additional resources raised through the rights equity issue. Table 6 reports the median changes in adjusted ratios over several periods. These results confirm the pattern reported in Table 5 . The decline in performance is more severe compared to the studies from the US market but it is not statistically significant in all the years. Additionally, we are reporting regressions (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992) and portfolio aggregate ratios (Loughran and Ritter, 1997) . Our portfolio aggregate results in Table 7 are arrived at by dividing the aggregate numerator with the aggregate denominator. As pointed out by Loughran and Ritter (1997) , it is difficult to estimate the significance level for this portfolio aggregate. At the aggregate level, this decline is more severe showing the presence of big firms performing badly compared to small firms. We have also calculated the portfolio aggregate profitability after categorizing the firms into quartiles based on their asset size. We have not reported these results as the ratios show almost similar behaviour in all the quartiles. We estimate regressions with median post-issue value as the dependent variable and median pre-issue value as the independent variable, i.e.,
The focus of the analysis is on the significance and the sign of the intercept term as it captures the effect of equity issue on the variable under question. To reduce the influence of extreme observations, we winsorize the variables using 1 per cent and 99 per cent of the empirical distribution in all the regressions. The results in Table 8 confirm our earlier conclusions.
Operating Performance and Firm Characteristics
In this section, we examine the linkages between a number of firm-specific variables and operating performance subsequent to rights issue. We have included ownership group affiliation and managerial ownership in the analysis considering that these factors may play an important role in explaining operating performance in an emerging market like India. We are, however, reporting only the cash flow return to assets ratio here.
Ownership Group Affiliation
In order to study the impact of the difference in corporate control mechanism on post-rights issue performance, we have classified the sample into the following four major heads after removing government companies from the sample:
• companies belonging to large business groups
• companies belonging to small business groups • other private sector companies
• foreign companies.
The results are reported in Table 9 . Firms belonging to big business groups and other private sector companies show declining performance after the rights issue. Foreign companies and companies belonging to small business group do not show any declining trend subsequent to rights issue. Though it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for the differences in operating performance, several possibilities seem to be plausible. The major reason might be the difference in the corporate governance between various subgroups. 
Directors' Holding
Unlike their US or UK counterparts, major shareholders of the Indian firms take an active role in the management and decision-making process (Varma, 1997) . The managerowners may go for empire building and may act upon their desires (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Significant managerial ownership mitigates agency costs. But, high level of managerial ownership in an emerging market like India with a relatively high level of information asymmetry may allow manager-owners to expropriate wealth from other shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . For the Indian market, it is practically impossible to obtain a time series of directors' shareholding. Therefore, we used the directors' shareholding at the end of financial year 2002 to categorize the sample into quartiles. The results are reported in Table 10 . It is evident that the decline in performance is more severe and statistically significant for firms with lower directors' holding. Generally it supports the agency costs hypothesis.
Asset Size
To examine whether the decline in the performance is similar across firms with various asset sizes, we categorize the firms into quartiles based on their book value of asset in year -1. As asset size can be considered as proxy for information asymmetry, the decline in performance should be more severe for the small firms. But, small firms have better growth opportunities. Table 11 presents the adjusted cash operating profit for various asset size quartiles.
In general, firms in all categories show a declining operating performance after the rights equity issue. But, this decline is more severe for big firms. This pattern is inconsistent with the results from the US market reported by Loughran and Ritter (1997) and McLaughlin, Sufiedinne and Vasudevan (1998) . In these studies, the negative abnormal operating performance is high for smaller firms. To check the robustness of the results, we have classified firms on the basis of asset size at a common purchasing price by using wholesale price index as the deflator. We have also classified the firms on the basis of all the BSE-listed firms with asset size greater than Rs 50 million. We have not reported these results here as it is similar to the reported results.
Market-to-book Ratio
The post-issue decline in operating performance will be more severe for a firm with poor investment opportunities. In these firms, managers have an additional incentive to invest the cash flow in empire building and in negative net present value projects. To measure the growth opportunities, we used the market value of assets to book value of assets. Due to the non-availability of share prices for some of the firms, we were able to calculate the marketto-book ratio for only 327 firms. If one considers the market-to-book ratio as proxy for information asymmetry, Note: This table reports the median match-adjusted changes in operating cash profit to assets for the sample portioned on the basis of ownership group. The ownership group affiliation data are taken from the Prowess database. Government companies are removed from the sample.
then firms with higher market-to-book ratio should exhibit more negative changes in performance (McLaughlin, Sufieddine and Vasudevan, 1998) . But, these firms have better opportunities to invest the additional funds raised through the equity issue. Since there is a wide variation in the market-to-book ratio over the period, we categorized the firms into two groups based on their market-to-book ratio in the year prior to the rights issue by comparing with median market to book ratio of all the BSE-listed firms with book value of asset equal to or greater than Rs 50 million. Out of the total 327 firms, 176 firms have a market-to-book ratio above the median level. From Table 12 , it is clear that though both categories show deteriorating performance, it is more severe and statistically significant for firms with market-to-book value ratio below the median level. Interestingly, for firms with share price data (327 firms), the post-issue declining trend is statistically significant in four out of the five years compared to three years in case of the original sample of 392 firms.
Growth and Leverage around Rights Equity Issue
The empirical results presented in the previous section should be interpreted more carefully if rights issues are simple de-leveraging transactions. To analyse this, we have computed the growth ratios and leverage ratios around the rights equity issue. We calculated the growth rates of total assets, gross fixed assets, net fixed assets, and sales. The results presented in Table 13 show that a major chunk of the additional resources (median relative issue size is 18% of the total assets) is invested in fixed assets either in the year of issue or in the next year. But, as observed in the previous section, rights issuers failed to generate additional sales from the investment in fixed assets. In fact, the median growth rate in sales is negative compared to the matching firms after the rights issue. Further, we analysed the leverage ratios of the rights issuers.
From Table 14 , it is evident that these rights issuers are basically highly leveraged firms compared to the nonissuers. Due to the infusion of additional equity, this difference vanishes but, after two years, these firms again become more leveraged companies. From Table 15 , it is clear that the reduction in leverage compared to year -1 is statistically significant only up to two years after the issue. From year 3 onwards, this decline has become insignificant.
We have also analysed the cash flow pattern around the rights equity issue to gain further understanding. First, we calculated the cash flow on account of capital expenditure which is defined as the net flow on account of capital expenses and fixed assets purchase/sale. We scaled this Note: This table reports the median match-adjusted changes in operating cash profit to assets for the sample portioned on the basis of market-to-book value of assets in year -1 relative to the year of rights issue. The firms are categorized into two groups after comparing with the median book-to-market value of assets for all the BSE-listed firms with book value of assets equal to or greater than Rs 50 million.
with book value of total assets. The next measure is net flow on account of loan scaled to book value of total assets. Since the Prowess database provides data on cash flow only from 1995, the number of firms in this analysis is reduced to one-third of the sample. The results are generally in agreement with our previous results. Interestingly, rights issuers raised additional funds through bank finance/debt issue during year 1 and year 2 relative to rights issue. In general, a major portion of the rights issue proceeds are utilized for capital investment.
Multivariate Analysis
In this section, we examine the effect of firm-specific variables in explaining the post-issue deterioration in performance. Here, we regress the decline in performance against a number of firm-specific and issuespecific variables. The dependent variables are the difference between median post-issue (period starting from year +1 to year +5 relative to rights equity issue) adjusted cash operating profit and pre-issue (period starting from year -3 to year -1 relative to rights equity issue) adjusted cash operating profit. The explanatory variables are pre-issue run up, cash flow, firm size, firm age, a dummy variable for the market value to book value of assets, directors' holding, leverage, earnings management, relative issue size, and two dummy variables to accommodate ownership group affiliation. Pre-issue run-up is defined as the increase in cash operating profit from year -2 to -1. The variable earnings management is defined as the adjusted change in earnings from year -2 to -1 after deducting the change in cash operating profit. The dummy variable for the market-to-book ratio is assumed to be 1 if the marketto-book ratio is above the median. If data on marketto-book ratio are not available, we assume that it is below the median level. Cash flow is defined as the operating cash flow at the end of year-1. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 16 . In the first model, we have not included pre-issue run-up. The variables -cash flow, earnings management, and dummy for private companies -have significant negative coefficient. Firms with greater cash operating profit which raise additional funds through rights issue have greater decline in performance. Similarly, firms that have sudden increase in earnings compared to change in cash operating profit also have greater decline in profit. As observed in the previous analysis, firms belonging to private companies have greater decline in performance during the post-issue period. The coefficients for the other independent variables are not significant at customary levels. In the second model, pre-issue run-up has a significant positive coefficient. These results are inconsistent with the results of McLaughlin, Sufieddine and Vasudevan (1998) . The coefficient of cash flow is negative and statistically significant. Generally, most coefficients have expected Note: Definition of leverage 1 and leverage 2 are given in Table 3 .
signs but the explanatory power of the models is weak.
Behaviour of Market Expectation
In this sub-section, we examine whether our results are consistent with the changes in market expectations around the rights equity issue. We have analysed the behaviour of market-to-book value of assets, market-to-book value of equity, and price-earnings multiple. The market expectations about these firms reach the maximum in the year of issue. This is consistent with the result that valuation measures like market-to-book ratio and prior stock return are the important determinants of equity issue decision (Bayless and Chaplinksy, 1991; Jung, Kim and Stulz,1996) . The median difference in the priceearnings multiple is 3.5 in the year of issue. Subsequently, the market incorporates the deteriorating performance and the valuation ratios are showing a generally declining trend. The median price-earnings multiple has declined to 2.64 in year +5. This has led to a statistically significant median difference of -0.81 in the year 5. From Table 17 , it is evident that the market revises the superior valuation only from year 2. Thereafter, all the adjusted valuation ratios are negative and this difference is statistically significant in almost all the years. Though this analysis is not a substitute for an analysis on long-run security price performance following rights equity issue, it may indicate long-run underperformance following rights issue.
CONCLUSION
This paper documents the operating performance around equity rights offerings during 1991-2000 in the Indian market. Consistent with the studies from well-developed markets like that of the US, the Indian firms also show declining profitability after the equity issue. This decline is statistically significant in most of the five years subsequent to rights equity issue. This deterioration in performance is more severe for big firms, low book-tomarket value firms, and firms with lower directors' holdings. But, the decline in operating performance is primarily due to the inefficient utilization of assets which is in contrast to the results from the US market. Similarly, Indian firms with no affiliation to business groups show greater decline compared to firms with group affiliation and foreign companies. Among rights equity issuers, private firms with lower directors' holdings exhibit greater decline in performance. Further, various proxies measuring market valuation also declined during the post-issue period after a run-up in the pre-issue period. Overall, our results support agency cost model and investment opportunity hypothesis.
There are a number of avenues open for further research like long-run stock price performance and earnings management around the rights equity issue. Similarly, the performance of firms following major public debt issues and determinants of capital issue choice, etc. can also be studied.
IMPLICATIONS
The above findings have implications for managers, investors, regulators, and other capital market participants.
Implications for Managers and Investors
Two major explanations can be offered for the documented deteriorating performance of rights equity issuers. First, potential issuers may be actively managing their earnings for the success of their issues. Second, the issuers are timing their rights equity issue irrespective of the requirements of funds that may be leading to overinvestment. Our evidence supports the second argument and we found that a typical underperformer is a firm with lower investment opportunities. The finding that large firms are performing badly also supports this argument. This overinvestment may be because managers are overoptimistic about the investment opportunities of the firm like the investors at the time of issue. Alternatively, it may be due to the opportunistic behaviour of the managers. This means that managers are realistic but they want to exploit the prevailing positive market sentiment and go for 'empire building. ' The investing public and analysts who are too optimistic about the issuers should consider the fact of deteriorating performance while arriving at the valuations. In general, investors should be vigilant about the 'empire building' implications of increased investments through rights issue. On the other hand, optimistic managers should reassess the investment opportunities and have conservative plans before approaching the market. Especially, large firms with lower investment opportunities should be more disciplined while approaching the capital market.
Implications for Policy-makers
We found that investment opportunity is a major determinant of performance in the post-issue period. Large firms and firms with below median market-to-book ratio are the worst performers. The regulators have to look into the requirement of funds and the quality of the potential investment in the case of large firms. A major obstacle in designing a monitoring policy may be the difficulty in identifying the managers with opportunistic behaviour. This paper provides some guidance on this matter. We demonstrate that group affiliation and managerial ownership can influence firm performance following rights equity issue. The policy-makers and regulators should come out with better regulatory framework to control and punish opportunistic managers. This can vary from stringent regulations for better reporting to monitoring of the usage of additional funds raised through rights equity. 
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